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/ 
[8. F. No. 17249. lD Bank. Nov. 27. 1945.J 
JOHN B. ELLIS et aI., Petitioners, v. THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF THE SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED 
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al .. Respondents. 
[1] 8ehools-Property-Ule as Oenter for Oommunity Activities. 
-The Civie Center Act (Ed. Code, §§ 19431-19439), relating to 
the use of school buildinJ;rS or gTounds as eenters for com-
munity activities. is controlling - with regard to the use of 
sehool property for luch purposes, and regulations or terms 
and conditions made bv the IIchool board in conflict therewith 
are invalid. . 
[i] Id.-Property-Uae as Oenter for Oommunity Activiti_Pub-
He Liability Iuurance.-The srrantinlt by a echool board to an 
[1] Uee of echool property for other than sehool or religious 
purposes, not. 86 A.L.B.. ltD!,). See. 1I1so. 23 OaLJ'ar. 102; '7 
Am.lar. 344. 
McX.xq. Beference: [1-5] Schools, 165. 
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outside organization of pcr~issioil to use a school auditorillm 
for a free public meeting cannot be coni!itioned on paympnt 
by such organization of~p cost of pnhlil' liAhility inSllrAnce. 
whcre the insurance would proteC't thl' !'lehool di!'triet only 
against Iiabilify for injurip!, to othl'r!' firi!'in!? ont of hll7.nril!' 
incidE'nt to;thE' i!i!ltril't'~ ownE'rs~ ani! mllnfl!!'l'mpnt of thp 
building. schooll!Tounds. find equipment.. !line!' thp i!istrict 
cannot in this manner be relieved of it!' Iiahilitv for a failure 
to fulfill its dnties a.s to maintenfln(',e and man~!?ement of its 
property. "':. 
[8] Id.-PropeTty-Use as Center of Community Activities-Bent 
-Costs of Maintenance aDd Management.-A school district 
cannot require the pa~'ment of rent for mE'eting!' in a school 
building pursuant to thE' Civil' Center Act if admission fees 
are not chaJ'l!'E'd. nor requirE' the spon!lors of such a meeting to 
compensate the di!ltrict in any other manner for costs of main. 
tenance aDd mana[!ement en!luing from holdin!!' the meeting 
in such hnildinl!. 
[4] ld.-Properly-Use as Oenter for Oommunity Activities-Pub· 
lic Liabflity Insurance. - The ril!ht to use a school building 
unencumbered by expense!' for pnhli(' liahility insurance is 
established by Ed. Cnde. !I 19437. eXllIi('itlv making it the 
duty of the school di!ltrict to !!Tant "free" the nse of school 
property for the purpose!' statec1 in the Civic Center A('t. and 
also by !I 19439. whose purpose ill to relievE' those who hold 
a meeting in a school buildinl! pursuant to that stAtutE' of all 
expenses incident to thE' 1l!lE' of thE' huilding. 
[5] ld.-Properly-Use as Oenter for Oommunity Activities-Ex· 
penses.-Under Ed. Code. § 19439. cha~ng a school district 
not only with thE' expenses for the enumerated conveniences, 
but also with an "other necessary expenses in connection with 
the use of public school buildings." thE' words "other neces-
sary expense!l" do not relate only to expenses for facilities 
and services similar to those enumerated. and which are those 
which most commonlv Occur. but cover whatever necessary 
expenses may arise. The qualifying adjective "necessary" es-
tablishes the kinship between the expenses enumerated and 
other expense!l. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the granting of an 
application to use a school auditorium for a mass meet-
ing without requiring petitioners to furnish public liability 
insurance. Writ granted. 
Wayne M. COlliIDi, J. Lamar Butler and Lawrence W. 
Allen for Petitioners. 
) 
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A. L. Wirin as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioncrs . 
.. 
John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, Walter A. Dold, Chief 
Deputy City Attlfrney, and Irving G. Breyer for Respondent.'l. 
TRAYNOR,~.-By this proceeding in mandamus petition-
ers seek to,...:.compel respoI!dents. to permit them to use the 
auditorium of the Evening High School of Commerce at 
San Francisco for a meeting open to the public wit.hout 
charge on Sunday afternoon. December 2, 1945. free of any 
requirement that th\y furnish publi(' liability insurance. 
In an earlier proceeding petitioneJ'!'l Rou!!ht a writ of man-
date to compel reRpondent hoard to grant them the use of 
the auditorium on an evenin!! when regular cla8!le.<l were Rched-
uled in the Rchool bUilding. ThiR court denied their petition. 
holding that the board acted within i~ authority under Edu-
cation Code section 19433 in rejecting petitioneJ'!'l'application 
on the ground that the propORed meeting would interfere with 
scheduled school activitie.'l fPayro71 Guarantee Association 
v. Board of Education, ante. p. 197 fl63 P.2d 4331.) Peti-
tionen then requeRted permiR.~ion to URe the auditorium for 
the same purpORe and with the Rame speaker on 8 Sunday 
afternoon. when there will be no school activititlR. Respond-
ent board baR granted their application on condition that 
petitioneJ'!'l furnish a public liability insurance policy in 
the name of the San Francisco Unified School District in the 
sum of $100.000 for each injured person and $400.000 for 
each accident. In the earlier proceeding. petitioner!l declared 
that they would meet that condition under protest. They 
now contend that mch a condition would prevent them 
from holding the meeting, and have mbmitted affidaviu: t.o 
show that. although they have applied to man~' immrance 
companies. none haR bflen willing to i!!SUe them 8 policy. 
[1] On September 28. 1943. respondent board adopted the 
following resolution: "Re.'!olved: That whenever the u!'Ie of 
school property iR granted to an out.qide organization under 
the provisions of Section 19431 of the California Education 
Code. no charge shall be madE' for heating, lighting. janitorial 
or other services, except aR !'let forth under the provision!l of 
section 19438 of the California Education Code.' and the cost 
of mch !'Iervicefl aR notec1 qhall bE' providflc1 for out of !lehool 
IThis section authorizes a charge for the nse of eeboolhon!leS. propertl.-
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district funds. Further resfllved: 'fhat when an auditorium 
or gymnasium is reques~, a public liability insurance policy 
shall be furnished in the name of the SaIl Francisco Unified 
School District in the sum of $100,900/$400,000, exctlpt that 
the requirement for said policy lQIty be waived for organiza-
tions, clubs or association.'! organized for general character 
building, welfare purposes, or in connection with the national 
war effort. Furtlier resolved: That all rules and regulations 
of this Board jIt conflict with the above are hereby repealed." 
Respondent board contends that this regulation is author-
ized by sections 2204, 19401, 19433, 19434, and 19435 of the 
Education Code, quoted.. in the margin.' Petitioners contend 
that the regulation is invalid on the grounds that it violates 
the basi<! purpose of the Civic Center Act (Ed. Code, §§ 19431-
19439) and conflicts with sections 19437 and 19439 of the 
Education Code, quoted in the margin.1 Petitioners have 
made their application under the Civic Center Act. That. 
act is controlling, and regulations or terms and condi-
tions made by the board in conflict therewith are invalid. 
11"2204. The governing board of any school district shall: (a) Pre-
scribe and enforce rule!' not inconsistent with the law or with the rules 
prescribed by the 8tate Board of Edueation, for its own government, and 
for the government of the schools under its jurisdiction." 
"19401. The governing bOllrd of any school district may grant the Il8e 
of school buildings or grounds for public, literary,lcientillc, recreational, 
or educational meetings, or for the discussion of matters of general or 
public intl'rest upon such terms and conditions as the board deems proper, 
and subJect to the limitations. requirements. and restrictions Bet forth 
in this chapter" 
"19433. The USI' ot any public sellool bouse and grounds for any meet-
mg is subj8<'t to such reasonable rules and regulations as the governing 
board of the district prescribes and shall in nowise interfere with the use 
and occupancy of the publit'. schoolhouse and r,-ounds, as is required for 
the purposes of thp publit' BChools of the state. ' 
"19434. The management, direction, and control of the civic center is 
vested in the governing board of the aehool district." 
"19435. Th!' governing board of the school district shall make all 
needful rules and regulntioIUI for conducting the civic meetings and for 
such recreational activities as are provided for in this chapter and which 
aid, assist, and lend encouragement to the activities." 
1"19437. The Ullt: of schOOlhouses, property, and grounds P\l1"ll1l8.Dt to 
this chapter shall be granted free," 
"19439. Lighting, heating, janitor service, and the services of the 
person when needed, and other necessary expenses, in connection with the. 
use of public school buildings and grounds pursuant to this chapter, shall 
hp. provided for out of the county or special school funds of the respec-
tive school districts in the same manner and by the l&Dle authority .. 
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(First Industrial Loan Co. v. Dailgherty, 26 Cal.2d 545, 550 
[159 P.2d 921]; Whitcomb lfotel Inc. v. California Emp. 
Com., 24 Cal.2d 753. 757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. -l05]; 
Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797].) 
Respondents have stated that the dil;trict is generally not 
insured a~ainst public liability with respect to its school 
buildings and grounds. but that they deem such insurance 
necessaf"y, with certain exceptions, when schools are used for 
the purposes specified in the Civic Center Act. We are here 
concerned, not with the board's authoritv to insure the dis-
trict against su'<!b liability (see Ed. Code, § 1029) or with 
the exercise of its discretion in determining whether such in-
surance is necessary, but only with the question whether the 
board can require others to pay the costs of such insurance. 
[2] Any inquiry into the validity of the regulation must 
consider the nature of the insurance protection that re-
spondent board requires petitioners to furnish. Respondent 
board states that claims might be made against it for injuries 
resulting from an alleged defective condition of the school 
building and its equipment or of the school grounds, or from 
alleged inadequate exits in case of fire or other emergency, 
or from an alleged failure to appoint custodians to maintain 
order in connection with the meeting. By way of illustration 
. it has filed a policy recently furnished by another association 
in connection with an application for the use of the Galileo 
High School Auditorium. That policy names as the insured 
the "San Francisco Unified School District and/or Individual 
Members of San Francisco Board of Education while acting 
within the scope of their duties as such" and also the associa-
tion. The board's regulation, however, requires only that 
the policy be furnished in the name of the school district. 
The coverage is defined as follows: "Coverage A-Bodily 
Injury Liability-To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums 
which the Insured shall become obligated to pay by reason 
of the liability imposed upon him by law for damageS, in-
cluding damages for care and loss of services, because of 
bodily injury, including death at any time resulting there-
from, sustained by any person or persons, caused by accident 
and arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined. Coverage 
B-Property Damage Liability-To pay on behalf of the 
Insured all sums which the Insured shall become obligated 
to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law 
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including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident and 
arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined." The hazards 
are defined as follows: "Division 1. Premises-Operations 
-The ownership, lllJl.intenance or use, for the purposes stated 
in the declarations, of the pre~ses, and all operationR dur-
ing the policy 6"eriod which are necessary or incidental to 
such purposes. Division 2. ElevatorR-The ownership, main-
tenance, or use, for the ,purposes stated'.in the declarations. 
of any elevator therein~designated." The company also 
agreed to "defend in his name and behalf any suit against 
the Insured alleging such injury or destruction and seek-
ing damages on account thereof, even if such suit is ground-
less, false or fraudulent." 
The policy required would not insure the school district 
against injury to the school building or other property of 
the district, or against liability for injuries resulting from 
conduct of those attending or prote..<rting the meeting for which 
respondents would not be responsible. It would insure the 
district only against liability for injuries to others arising 
out of the hazards incident to the school district's owner-
ship and management of the building, schoolgrounds, and 
equipment. Such hazards would arise from the failure of 
the district to maintain the premises and equipment in a 
reasonably safe condition or to fulfill its duties in managing 
the property. In effect respondents demand insurance pro-
tection against their liability to others in the event they 
fail to fulfill their own duties as owners or managers of 
the school property. The cost of that protection is a cost 
of maintenance and management. In the absence of insurance, 
damages to anyone entitled to recover against the school 
district for its failure to fulfill its duties would be paid by 
the district, and the district would also bear the cost of 
defending the actions brought against it. If a district pro-
vided for such risks by maintaining reserves to meet claims 
for injury as they arose, the current contributions to such 
reserve funds would be costs of maintenance and manage-
ment just as would the costs of upkeep and repair to mini-
mize the risk of injuries. Similarly, insurance premiums on 
a policy protecting the district against liability for failure 
to fulfill its duties as to maintenance and management of its 
property are part of the cost of such maintenance and manage-
ment. If a public meeting in a school auditorium attracts 
people who otherwise would not enter the premises, and there-
I 
) 
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for enlarges the risk of injuries, the district is not thereby 
relieved of liability as owner and manager of the property. 
In that capacity it must assume the expense of insurance 
as it does the~ expense of lighting, heating, and janitorial 
service. . 
[3] Although such costs would enter into any rental, the 
school district cannot require the payment of rent for meet-
ings pursuant to the ... Civic Center Act, if admission fees are 
not charged ...... Nor can it require the sponsors of a meeting 
to compensate the district in any other manner for costs of 
maintenance and management ensuing from the holding of 
a meeting in a school._ building. The district must bear the 
burden of costs attendant upon public meetings in school 
buildings for the purposes specified in the Civic Center Act, 
just as it bears the burden of costs of regular school ac-
tivities. [4] The Legislature, in the Civic Center Act, 
explicitly make,q it the duty of the school district to grant 
"free" the use of schoolhouse..<;, property, and grounds for 
the purposes stated in the act. (§ 19437.) The use of such 
property would not be free if the school district required 
the sponsors of a meeting to share the costs of 'maintenance 
and management of the buildings and grounds or any part 
thereof. The Civic Center Act not only provides school build-
ings free of charge but facilitates the use of such property 
for the public purposes specified in the act, by providing in 
section 19439 that the school district shall bear the expenses 
attendant upon the public use of the property. 
If the right to use a school building unencumbered by 
expenses for public liability insurance were not already estab-
lished by section 19437, it would follow from section 19439, 
whose purpose it is to relieve those who hold a meeting in 
a school building pursuant to the Civic Center Act of all 
expenses incident to the use of the building. [6] Section 
19439 charges the district not only with the expenses for 
the enumerated conveniences but with all "other necessary 
expenses in connection with the use of public school build-' 
ings." Respondent board contends that under the ejusdem 
generis rule, the words "other necessary expenses" relate 
only to expenses for facilities and services similar to those 
enumerated. It seems clear, however, that the Legislature 
enumerated the expenses that most commonly occur, adding 
the accompanying phrase "other necessary expenses" to 
cover whatever necessary expenses might arise other than 
) 
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the most common ones. Its enumeration of the most com-
mon ones carries no implication that other necessary ex-
penses should be borne by the users of a school building 
merely because they do not resemble the ones enumerated. 
The qualifying adjective Rnecessary" establishes the kinship 
between the expeiises .enumerated and other expenses, and 
therein lies theJrey to the Legislature's intention that all neces-
sary expenses are to be borne by the district. The theory that 
"necessary" designates only tli~e expenses that bear a re-
semblance as well as a lti.rlship to those enumerated is hardly 
tenable, for it would lead to an imposition of necessary ex-
penses upon the users of a school building that would in 
effect nullify their right to the free use of the building. 
The import of "other necessary expenses" is as broad as 
"all necessary expenses" (Ed. Code, § 24410), which the dis-
trict must bear if school property is used for community 
recreation pursuant to chapter 4, division 12 of the Educa-
tion Code. The Legislature expressly provided in that chapter 
(§ 24408) that the use of the school property for recreation 
shall not restrict or otherwise affect the use of the property 
under the Civic Center Act, thus making the first use sub-
ordinate to the second. Yet all necessary expenses incident 
to recreational uses of school property must be borne by 
the school district. Hence the Legislature could hardly have 
intended to impose on the sponsors of a meeting in a school 
building under the Civic Center Act any of the necessary 
expenses incident to the use of the building for that meet-
ing. If the expense of public liability insurance is neces-
sary to such a meeting, it must be borne by the school 
district under section 19439. 
This construction of the Civic Center Act is compelled 
not only by its wording but by the purpose of the Legis-
lature to make school buildings centers of free public as-
sembly in so far as such assembly does not encroach upon 
the educational activities, which constitute the primary pur-
pose of the schools. The purpose of the Legislature would 
be frustrated if petitionCfS' right to the free use of the 
school auditorium were nullified by the requirement that 
they furnish public liability insurance. It follows that the 
regulation adopted by respondent board is invalid. 
Since the board cannot require the furnishing of a policy 
of public liability insurance as a condition for the use of 
330 ELLIS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION [27 C.2d 
a school auditorium under the Civic Center Act, it is 
unnecessary to consider petitioIlilr's arguments that the ex-
emptions authorized in the. regulation are unreasonably 
discriminatory and would en~le the board to act as a censor 
by imposing the requirement arbitrarily upon those groups 
whose views it disapproves. ! 
Let the perempt~ writ issue forthwith. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the views expressed in the 
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor, but I am also 
of the opinion that the writ should issue compelling the 
board of education to grant the permit for the use of the 
auditorium without the requirement that petitioner furnish 
to said board a policy of public liability insurance, for the 
reason that, in my opinion, the attempted classification of 
organizations contained in the resolution adopted by said 
hoard on September 28, 1943, cOJu;titutes an unreasonable 
and discriminatory regulation which purports to repose in 
~'rI icl board unlimited discretion to determine which "organi-
zations. clubs or associations," are "organized for general 
<'hnractel' building, welfare purposes, or in connection with 
t hE' national war effort," and thus may be exempted from 
the requirement of furnishing such a policy. Hence, the 
power to censor is thus lodged in the members of the board. 
;'his opens the door to permit the board to discriminate in 
fayor of organizations and groups which they like and against 
those they do not like. Such discrimination is in direct viola-
tion of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and 
assembly. The constitutional mandate which confers these 
rights contemplates that they should be exercised without dis-
crimination. It does not mean that they may be exercised 
freely by some and that othen: may exercise them only after 
complying with burdensome restrictions, even if such re-
strictions are such that may be complied with. On the right 
to give expression to idea.q there should be no restrictions 
except when elements of clear and present danger exist. 
It may be true that the Legislature was under no consti-
tutional obligation to dedicate school buildings as civic cen-
ters in which citizens and groups ma~' hold public meetings, 
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made by the people in conducting public meetings at such 
civic centers may not be subject either to censorship, arbi-
trary action or unepnstitntional restrictions by the governing 
boards of education. 
The constitu1'1Onality of- a regulation having the tendency 
to abridge freedom of. speech or assembly should be judged 
by the opportunities""'fo~ censorship and discrimination in-
herent in it, and not alone by the regulation in actual ad-
ministration. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2fHl fGO 
S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213. 128 :.tJJ.R 1352], in discussing the 
provisions of a statute regulating the ~olicitation of funds 
by religious organizations, the Supreme Court said: 
"But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetua-
tion of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of 
which rests in the exercise of a determination by state au-
thority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden 
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Consti-
tution." (See, also, Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 [63 S.Ct. 
667, 87 L.Ed. 873] j and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 
105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81].) 
When the case of Hague v. C. I. 0.,307 U.S. 496 [59 S.Ct. 
954, 83 L.Ed. 1423], was pending before the Supreme Court 
of the United States, the American Bar Association's Spe-
cial Committee on the Bill of Rights filed an amici curiae 
brief in support of the contention of the Committee for 
Industrial Organization. A summary of this brief is con-
tained in 25 American Bar Association Journal commencing 
at page 7. After analyzing the decisions relative to the right 
of cities and public boards to exercise control over public 
property, the brief contains the following discussion which 
is applicable to the problem here involved. I quote from 
page 74 of said ,Journal: 
"The true analogy to government ownership of parks and 
other property dedicated to public uses is furnished by a 
public utility, which must give service to all 80 long as this 
is consistent with the performance of its functions. It can 
regulate, but not di!!criminate. It can refuse to deal with 
those who interfere with its functions or with other users 
of its service, or when the available services are exhausted. 
We already recognize this principle as applied to govern-
mental substitutes for private utilities. Thus a municipal 
street railway can eject "drunks" and set a limit on over-
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port members of unpopular groups even if other passengers 
express a dislike for them. 
"In the same '*ay, the parks can be regulated in a man-
ner consistent>l'i-dth their purposes. one of the most important 
of which is the right of free assembl~' therein for public 
discussion at reasonable times and places. Disorderly per· 
sons can be excluded .. 'because the~' interfere with peaceable 
users of the parks like drunks in the municipal trolley car. 
Open-air meetin~ can be assigned to a particular park or 
a particular area, just as passengerR can be assigned to par-
ticular seats or told to move awav from the door. If all 
the available space i" occll)Jied and there is no more room 
for meetings, permits can stop, just as a full municipal street 
car can refuse to take on pa..'lsengers. But we submit that 
law-abiding Democrats or Republicans or Communist..o; or 
unionists or memberR of the American Civil Libertie.c;; Union 
ean no more be constitutionally kept out of empty park 
spaces reasonably ~itable for open-air meeting!' than they 
ean be ejected from an empty municipal trolley car. or be 
refused current from a municipal power plant. 
"In sum, a city is required to furniRh its municipal serv-
ices to all, Rubject only to reasonable rules. Surely this prin-
ciple is no less applicablp when those 'lervi(\e~ include the 
making available of space for open-air meetings, in pursuance 
of the right of a..'lSembly that is gl1aranteed b~- t.he Constitu-
tion of the United States. 
"The basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of 
the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than 
force; and this means talk for all and by all .... " 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was adopted because of t.he fear of the people that 
those in power might attempt by law to prohibit the free 
exercise of the right to wOl'Rhip or abridge "freedom of speech, 
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redres.o:: of grievance.'l." 
The people of that generation had witnessed the abuse of 
power by many of those in whom it was reposed. Washington 
knew, as few men did. that the inherent danger which 
threatened the overthrow of constitutional Iibertie.c;; was. as 
he said, "the love of power and pronene."IS to abuse it. which 
predominates in the human heart." ever tempting the ad-
ministrators of Jaw and justice tl) override the constitutional 
guarantees of human rights. It finally required the adoption 
) 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend to the people of the 
several !':tates the rights guaranteed by the First Ten Amend-
ments. But 'It ill the abuse of power continued and will con-
tinue so long aR those who are permitted to exercise it are 
swayed by con!':iderations" other than those of justice. fair-
ness and equality. -: . 
It has been s~id tIfat: "Power is a bell which prevents 
those who set It pealing from hearing any other sound." 
h the last analysis it is for the court.~ to declare the extent 
to which administrative power' may be exercised in the light 
of the constitutional and statutory provisions fixing the limits 
of such power. 
EDMONDS, J.-Considering the record in this proceeding. 
I find no basis for the conclusion that the court is not con-
cerned "with the board's authority to insure the district 
again ... [public liability with respect to its school build-
ings and grounds when used for purposes specified in the 
Civic Center Act] (see Ed. Code. § 1029) or with the exercise 
of its discretion in determinin/! whether such insurance iR 
necessary, but only with the question whether the board can 
require others to pay the cost." of 'IU<.'h inRUrance." In con-
nection with the demandR of the petitioner for the use of 
the auditorium. there had been filed with the Board of Edu-
cation an affidavit made by Paul Schnur in behalf of various 
organization:-; affiliated with the San Francisco Industrial 
Union Council and 13 others. including the San Francisco 
Federation of Voters Leagues and the National Association 
for the Advancement of the Colored People. There iR wide-
spread convi('tion among the thonsandR of members in these 
organizations. the affiant declared. that the program of Gerald 
L. K. Smith i" intended "to incite to violence by setting race 
. against race. religion against religion. white against black. in 
an atmosphere of hatred and violence . . . all in order to 
create rio1.~. terror and chaoR .." According to the affida\'it 
of Schnur. the people represented by him "have read of the 
rio1.o; whi<.'h followed close upon ... fthe] public meetings 
and speeche.~ lof Smith] in such citiC!'; as Detroit. New York 
and LoR Angeles: . f and] will not allow Smit.h to con-
duct a campaign of terror and violence without protest . . ." 
With this affidavit before it. the board of education was 
confronted with the que.~tion fI,..'1 to its liability for injury to 
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tiOll for the use of the school auditorium and there was a 
riot or other violence. ~V .. Justice Traynor discusses that 
liabilit.v solely from the standpoint of responsibility for 
negligence in <l-onnection with t.he maintenance or usc of the 
building. But there ma~' be liability without fault. The 
doctrine Is .... applicable, it ill said. ~here. even though the 
defendant's conr1urt i!-i sociall~' acsil'a ble. the danger which it 
threatem; to others is unusually great, and will be great even 
though the enterpri!l\l is conducted with ever~' possible pre· 
caut.ion. Because of the unusual gravity of t.he risk. he is held 
liable for act.!' which in themselves are regarded as reason· 
able. The basis of liability is his intentional behavior in ex· . 
posing the community to such a risk. The conduct which is 
dealt with here occupies a middle ground; it is conduct which 
has so much social utility that it wiJ] not be t.reated as wrong· 
ful in itself, and will not be prohibited or enjoined in ad· 
vance, but not so much that the defendant may be allowed 
to carry it on without liability at the expense of actual dam· 
age to his neighbors." (Pros.<;er on Torts, p. 429.) 
The application of the organization sponsoring Smith to 
use the school property came to the board of education with 
at leMt a prima facie showing that there had been riots at 
meeting!' of a similar character held in other citie,.<; and the 
consequent possibility of suit." for damages in the event of 
violence at a meeting addressed by Smith in the Commerce 
High School. Under these circumlrtances, the requirement 
of the board for public liability insurance is not an unreason-
able one. A majority of the court impliedly. if not directly, 
so hold. but they say that if !lUch insurance is necessary, 
the premium for the policy must be paid by the school dis-
trict as an expense specified in section 19439 of the Education 
Code. However, the board of education has no authority to 
procure public liability insurance with full coyerage against 
responsibility for injurie.~ to persons or property. Under the 
Education Code the district may only insure its liability 
and the personal liability of the members of the board "for 
damages by reason of death, or injury to person or property, 
as the result of any negligent act." (Italic.~ added.) (§ 1029.) 
Accordingly. by the decision of thi~ court. the Board of 
Education ~ required to allow the use of school property 
for a meeting which, there is reasonable ground to be-
lieve, may result in violence or riot, but it cannot protect 
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the benefit of the public except al; a private undertaking 
at private expense. 
No one haR all absolut'll'ight to hold a meeting in a public 
school, and the Legislntpre has declared that the use of any 
public SCllOolhouse and grounds "is subject to such reason-
able rules and regulations as the governillg board of the dis-
trict prescribes." (Ed. Code, §.194·33.) Free speech is one 
of 0UI' most cherished constituti~'nal rights but. it is subject 
to certain limitations, For example. as Mr .. Justice Holmes 
laconically stated, the right of free speech does not permit 
one falsely to cry "Fire" in a crowded theatre. (Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 [39 8. Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 4701.) 
For thes"l reasons, in my opinion, the writ of mandate 
should be denied. 
